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Managing Political Risks in Emerging Market Investment
Kenneth W. Hansen*
Emerging market investment is often seen, as the theme of this conference
suggests, as a worthy subcategory of the broader field of international
investment. Some of what investors perceive as special about investing in
emerging markets, including impediments to such investments, is reasonably
evident. High on the list of things that make emerging market investment special
is political risk. If one is concerned about impediments to investment in places
where investors perceive political risk as important, then ways of mitigating that
risk, or at least passing it to someone else, become important parts of the process
of considering whether to invest in a project. Developers are likely to focus on
what they do best, whether that is building roads, producing power, providing
telecommunications services, or purifying water, while protecting themselves
from the local political environment. A primary mechanism for investors to
handle political risk is to pass it on to political risk insurers.
While political instability has come to be associated with emerging
markets-fairly or unfairly-commercial political risk insurers have received
requests for issuing coverage against political risk in the United States,
specifically California. In each case, insurers turned down that potential new
business. In passing on the opportunity, they took a bureaucratic approach, noting
that their respective business plans focused specifically on emerging markets
(i.e., "this is not in our department") rather than an underwriting approach, which
might have concluded that California politics simply pose uninsurable political
risks. The anecdote suggests that new markets remain to be exploited, even at
home, if the risks are eventually found to be manageable.
Political risk insurers come in two flavors-public and private. The public
agencies themselves come in two flavors-bilateral and multilateral. That may
suggest, however, that the public side of the market is broader than it actually is.
The public side of the industry has been dominated by one bilateral agency, the
U.S. Government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), and one
multilateral, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") of the
World Bank Group. These two agencies--OPIC for U.S. investors and MIGA as
the primary agency option for everyone else (so long as their home and target
countries are both members of MIGA)-until recently constituted the full set of
public provider options for project developers seeking coverage for their equity
investments. Debt investors (typically banks) had these public sector options plus
potentially two more. First, they could appeal to the relevant export credit
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agencies ("ECA"), whose export promotion programs typically offered
"political-only" guaranties of loans made by project lenders (if and to the extent
that the loan proceeds were to be spent in the ECA's home country). Second, in a
small but growing number of cases they might seek "partial risk guarantees"
issued by the multilateral development banks.
A decade ago, the World Bank introduced a guaranty for the HUB River
Project in Pakistan under which the project lenders were protected against losses
as a consequence of the host government's failure to perform its undertakings
related to the project. The Bank has offered such guarantees a half dozen times in
the decade since. Several regional multilateral development banks ("MDBs")
now offer partial risk guarantees to debt investors in projects. The Asian
Development Bank ("ADB"), in particular, has developed a range of creative
guaranty products. Almost all the MDBs, however, are getting into the action.
Sharing the mandate of bringing investment capital to difficult neighborhoods,
they each concluded that mitigating the political risks facing investors will
promote investment.
Complementing the small community of public agency providers of political
risk mitigation products is an even smaller group of commercial political risk
insurers that offer political risk coverage to both equity and debt investors in
emerging market projects. The commercial insurers have noted OPIC's profitable
history and decided that this is an area in which they can offer a service
profitably.
This market is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it comprises both
public and private sector providers. There are often interesting discussions-
academic, legislative, and practical-about which activities belong in the private
sector and which belong in the public sector. What is somewhat unusual is a
small market populated by both agencies and companies. The second interesting
quality is how the demand side of the political risk insurance market interacts
with the supply side. The users basically have two complaints: one, the products
are too narrow, and, two, they are the wrong products. It would be one thing if
they were the right products, but just too narrow, but to be both narrow and
wrong is problematic. How could this happen?
Generally, we expect markets to be driven by the tastes and preferences of
the demand side. If someone wants something that is technically feasible, and is
willing to pay for it, someone will step up to supply that demand. Why should the
political risk insurance industry not respond in the same way, giving project
investors the coverage they want, for a price they are willing to pay? That is, why
is supply not particularly responsive to demand?
I teach a course called "International Project Finance" in which we discuss
political risk. I ask the students to list all the political risks they can identify. The
first reactions usually consist of bad things done from time to time by
governments-e.g., war, revolution, expropriation, contract repudiation, etc. But
governments can also do perfectly appropriate things that nonetheless would
devastate an investment, such as imposing new regulations. Imagine that you
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open a factory relying on the current environmental regulations, and then the
World Bank convinces the authorities to increase the standards in a way that
makes it technically impossible for your factory to function. This is clearly a
political risk; a political decision devastated an investment. It may not be a bad
thing-except for the investor and its customers.
Consider all the ways that governments have the power, and perhaps even the
responsibility, to do that which could impair the success of an investment. It is a
long and disconcerting list that could-and does--discourage investors. Thank
heavens for political risk insurance. Unfortunately, while helpful, it may not fully
solve the problem.
Consider the situation of the prospective lenders to an emerging market
power project that some years ago were seeking OPIC political risk insurance
coverage. The lenders projected a certain profit margin, a spread between their
cost of funds and the interest rate they planned to charge for the loan. The lenders
planned to pay for the OPIC insurance out of this spread. The proposed pricing of
the OPIC insurance would take a pretty hefty bite out of that margin. The bankers
objected to OPIC's pricing. OPIC responded that the project technology was well
known, the fuel supply was secure, and a solid power purchase agreement with a
reliable off-taker assured adequate demand and revenues. Since the economics
and physics of this project were well established, the only material risks were
political. If the project were to fail, it would be because of a political risk. As the
political risk insurer, OPIC should receive most of the risk premium being
charged by the project lenders. The lenders responded that OPIC was correct in
its analysis of the project risks. If OPIC were taking all of the political risks, then
its pricing would have been appropriate. OPIC proposed, however, to accept a
basket of only three specific risks-currency inconvertibility, expropriation of
the project, and damage from political violence. Those were important risks, but
those other political risks identified by my students were all omitted from the
coverage. Thus, the project lender took (i.e., self-insured) all those other political
risks. The lender would earn the portion of the premium attributable to those
uncovered risks. OPIC should receive a much smaller piece of this risk premium,
properly reflecting the narrowness of the risks it was covering. The parties
successfully negotiated pricing terms, but the point was clearly made. The
political risk industry offers insurance as to certain particular political risks, but it
does not cover a significant portion of the potential political risks. Why not?
Perhaps certain risks are insurable and others are not. I have, however, never
seen an analysis that manages to explain which risks are, in principle, insurable
and which ones are not. I believe that the explanation is historical rather than
analytical.
The political risk industry originated with the Marshall Plan. That plan
involved, among other things, a great deal of U.S. government money allocated
to the reconstruction of post-war Europe. It would have been helpful to bring
private funds to bear as well as public money, which was in short supply relative
to the magnitude of the needs. The idea of incorporating private investment into
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the Marshall Plan originated, I understand, with Robert Bowie, a member of the
Marshall Plan staff, who later became a Harvard professor.
The thought was that, if U.S. businesses would buy a bombed-out factory or
other business disrupted by the war and provide some of the capital for repairs
and the restart of operations, people could return to work. People working would
restart the generation of income, tax payments, exports, and foreign exchange
earnings. People would be able to afford food again, relieving the pressure on
publicly-supported food programs. Their kids could return to school. Basically,
business investment could jump-start a return to normal commercial life in war-
torn Europe. The participation of private businesses would take some pressure off
of the limited public budget. It would also provide a more sustainable basis for
economic recovery. The ongoing operations of profitable businesses drive the
economy. A public expenditure may, or may not, have an enduring impact in
triggering economic activity. A profitable business operation may, however,
operate indefinitely, paying wages and taxes and contributing to both recovery
and the ongoing growth of economic activity. So, Bowie's team decided to try to
bring private U.S. businesses into the Marshall Plan.
In 1949 and 1950 a series of meetings were held at the old Executive Office
Building. CEOs of major corporations were courted to join the Marshall Plan.
Unfortunately, these business leaders wanted no part of it. As private citizens
they might be proud of what the government was doing, but as CEOs they were
responsible to their shareholders. To them, investment in Europe did not make
business sense. Remember, these conversations took place a half-century ago,
just after World War II.
The business leaders anticipated a number of concerns. First, the plan required
long-term investment. Projects needed to be up and operating for a number of years
before businesses would see an adequate return on their investment. One could not
depend on a long-term return on investment in Europe because of the likelihood of
another war. After all, the region had a chronic tendency to collapse into civil war.
Europe had just emerged from World War II, which was preceded by World War I
and, before that, the Spanish Civil War. Before that, the region had seen one conflict
after another. It was simply not the kind of place where companies would want to put
shareholders' money at risk on a long-term basis. Again, as taxpayers they might
have supported this, but as business people they would not participate.
Another concern expressed by these prospective investors was that, even if World
War 111 was avoided, the Russian Communists had already marched half way across
Western Europe. They might stop there, or they might not. Regardless of how far the
Russian Communists went, powerful indigenous socialist movements had been
established in the legislatures of most of Western Europe-including, for instance,
Italy, France, even England-and were becoming stronger. Once the socialists were in
control of a country where American businesses had invested, profits from those
investments would be unlikely. Paraphrasing the CEOs, "As much as we would like to
see the people of Europe get back to work, our boards of directors and our shareholders
are not interested in donating our factories as the people's property."
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Alternatively, the CEOs might have assumed that the next war would be
eluded, that the communists would not take over Western Europe, and that they
would actually have had the opportunity to run their businesses. Under this
scenario, one possibility is that the businesses would have failed. That risk was
acceptable. The CEOs were used to figuring out costs, revenues and market
factors-all risks that were managed in the normal course of their respective
businesses. On the other hand, the new businesses might have succeeded. That
success would have been earned, however, in local currencies-French and
Belgian Francs, Italian Lira, and German Deutschmarks. What use would the
investing companies have had for such currencies? Just a few years before,
Deutschmarks had been an international joke as a consequence of hyper-
inflation. Each one of those countries had borrowed heavily to finance the war;
their currencies were over-valued and were subject to severe foreign exchange
regulations. The likelihood was that, if an investment proved profitable, getting
that money converted to dollars and transferred home could have been a struggle.
The company might be required to reinvest some proportion of earnings, perhaps
100%, or might have prohibited from repatriating the original investment.
The potential investors raised all these concerns in those meetings with the
Marshall Planners. Intriguingly, the dominant concern was really the third-
currency controls. The Marshall Plan team responded that, if that risk were
standing in the way of participating, then the U.S. government would take that
risk. The Marshall Plan legislation included an investment insurance program in
which the U.S. government agreed that, if a participating U.S. business were to
earn foreign exchange but could not convert it and get it transferred home, the
U.S. government would give the investor dollars in New York. The investor
would turn over its foreign currency to the local U.S. embassy, which would use
it to fund its operations. A couple of years later, in two separate enactments,
Congress added investment insurance against losses resulting from political
violence, responding to the concern about the next war, and expropriation,
responding to concerns about the communists. These three distinct legislative
enactments provided three distinct political risk coverages in response to the
three specific concerns that were raised by prospective Marshall Plan business
recruits.
A number of post-war reconstruction programs survived the reconstruction
period and morphed into general development programs. For some, that was the
idea from the beginning. For instance, the World Bank, whose official name is
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was formed to
support both development and post-war reconstruction. With regard to the new
program of investment insurance against political risks, the thought within the
U.S. government was that, if it made good sense for U.S. businesses to be
involved with job creation in war-torn Europe, it also made sense that U.S.
companies should create jobs by establishing businesses in Africa, Latin
America, Asia and anywhere in the developing world. Like many programs that
figure out a new reason to live when the old one expires, the investment
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insurance program came through the 1950s to focus on projects in developing
countries.
Soon after John Kennedy was inaugurated as president, Congress passed the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, creating the Agency for International Development
("AID") as an umbrella under which the government's various development-related
programs were to be brought. Thus, the investment insurance program came to be
operated by AID.
In 1969, Congress adopted new legislation, introduced by Senator Jacob Javits of
New York, that set up a new, independent agency to administer the investment
insurance program. This agency was to be called the "Overseas Private Investment
Corporation." It would be neither private nor a corporation, but the point of the name
was to suggest a more business-like operating style than that of its more bureaucratic
predecessor.
Intriguingly, Senator Javits' brother Benjamin Javits had written a book in
1950 entitled Peace by Investment, in which he argued that development supports
peace, that business supports development, and that governments should support
development by promoting private business investment rather than public
expenditure programs. His model was similar to the ideas of the Marshall
Planners in establishing the investment insurance program. I have no idea
whether they conversed with Benjamin Javits or whether he discussed these
thoughts with his brother the Senator, but it is tempting to think that there might
have been some connection that gave rise to Senator Javits' inspiration that this
investment insurance program could be more effective if offered by a new
agency. In any event, Congress established OPIC and gave it a basket of
insurance contracts that had been issued by AID. Congress also provided OPIC
$50 million in initial capital, plus access to $38 million in reserves, and a $100
million credit line at the U.S. Treasury, all available to cover claims that might
arise under the existing portfolio of contracts.
The amount is important. The legislation establishing OPIC was adopted in
1969. OPIC opened its doors in 1971. Something important happened in
between. Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile with, among other
things, a program for permitting workers to vote to nationalize the foreign
businesses that employed them. The workers of a number of Chilean subsidiaries
of U.S. businesses chose to throw out the foreign owners. Several of those
foreign investments were insured by OPIC and in short order presented OPIC
with roughly one-half billion dollars in claims-overwhelming the mere $125
million in reserves that OPIC had been provided for paying claims.
Consequently, this new agency was potentially insolvent soon after it opened
its doors. This history shows that political risk insurance does not guarantee a
profit. It can be a perilous business for a number of reasons. How OPIC sorted
out the Chilean claims is yet another interesting story, although I will not go into
it here. Suffice it to say, the situation was sorted out successfully among
investors, OPIC, and the government of Chile.
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In sharp contrast to the financial crisis into which OPIC was born, OPIC has
operated profitably every year since it was established. As far as I have been able
to determine, no commercial insurer, in the U.S. or anywhere else, offered
similar insurance during the years prior to OPIC's establishment. In the early
1970s, a few commercial institutions joined the party-Lloyd's of London
started offering an OPIC-like product as did AIG, a U.S. insurance company. The
commercial programs typically would offer insurance for only three years for
less risky countries like Portugal, in contrast to OPIC's twenty-years coverage
available for Mauritania. Since its coverage was available for much longer terms,
OPIC continued to have a substantial monopoly, at least in the riskier arenas,
until 1988 when the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") was
established. MIGA, a political risk insurer within the World Bank Group, was
substantially modeled after OPIC but was meant to offer investors from all
member countries the sort of investrhent-promotion insurance that OPIC
provided U.S. investors.
This was the state of the political risk insurance market until the early 1990s, when
a dramatic change occurred in the development business-the privatization of the
development of public infrastructure. Country after country offered to turn over to the
private sector responsibility for building new power projects, telecommunication
systems, toll roads, water projects, etc. This opened up tremendous investment
opportunities for private businesses. Many of those opportunities were in emerging
markets, which gave rise to a jump in demand for political risk insurance.
Observers in the market, including some OPIC alumni, decided this presented an
interesting business opportunity, with two consequences. First, some new com-
mercial political risk insurers were established, and second, the existing commercial
political risk insurance providers substantially expanded their staff, their capacity,
and their commitment to this business. And that led to lobbying on Capitol Hill.
Some commercial insurers argued that OPIC posed unfair competition and should
get out of this business now that the private sector had come into being. The agencies
were no longer needed or welcome.
The demand side of the market welcomed the arrival of the commercial
insurers. The public sector programs had pesky inflexibilities. OPIC had its
statute; MIGA had its charter. The demand side of the market expected more
flexibility from the commercial insurers in providing novel political risk
coverages. The commercial insurers were not, however, as responsive as the
project investors had hoped. Why not?
Consider why these companies came into this business in the first place.
They did so because OPIC had been operating profitably for more than a quarter
century. The new insurers presumed that, if they were to offer the same coverage
on the same terms as OPIC, they would enjoy a similar profit. To the extent they
could offer a bit more flexibility, they might be able to attract more customers
and operate even more profitably.
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However, when asked to accept a novel risk-i.e., one never tried out at
OPIC-they resisted. Although insurance companies analyze and price risks all
the time, analyzing political risks is far from a science. In fact, it may not be
possible to quantify the risks these insurers are being asked to take, at least not in
any statistically meaningful way.
Or perhaps I am being too pessimistic. Let us attempt an empirical analysis
of expropriation risk in South America. What country in South America has the
greatest risk of expropriating projects over the last fifty years? Because of the
widespread expropriation of foreign businesses during the Allende years, Chile is
the easy winner.
Looking at South America today, what country is least likely to expropriate a
foreign business? It must again be Chile. So, if one is to analyze political risks over a
twenty-year term, which is still the standard for OPIC contracts, then how can that be
done in a way that will persuade a board of directors that it makes sense? This
challenge arises with respect to a coverage that is already readily available. What if
the issue were analyzing the risk of new prohibitive environmental regulations over
the next decade or the risk that that, someday, a newly-elected regime might cancel
undertakings made by its predecessors?
Decisions of the commercial insurers to enter the political risk business have
been based on OPIC's and MIGA's profitable, established track records, not
theoretical or empirical analysis of new risks. Consequently, the commercial
insurers, notwithstanding their legal flexibility, have tended to adopt the same
coverages that were first put in the market by the Marshall Plan a half century ago.
The inventors and subsequent managers of the U.S. government's investment
insurance program were fortunate that fairly arbitrary pricing according to what the
market would bear turned out to work as a business matter. It has worked brilliantly
for OPIC and MIGA. For the commercial entrants, so far, so good.
To be sure, the precedent of following OPIC's lead had already been set by
MIGA several years earlier. MIGA was established with quite a different charter
than that of OPIC. MIGA could have done things quite differently, but it brought
in as the senior underwriter a senior OPIC insurance officer. MIGA also recruited
OPIC's senior political risk insurance lawyer as its senior career lawyer. Not
surprisingly, the MIGA contract and program emerged looking a lot like OPIC-
not because the MIGA staff lacked creativity, but rather because their mandate
was to establish their operations in a way that made financial sense. How could
they be sure to do that? By doing what OPIC and its predecessor agencies had
done for the preceding forty-odd years.
One leading tension between supply and demand in the political risk market
place has been with respect to host government breaches of contract. As co-ventures
with the host government, private investors in public-private partnerships have a
different kind of relationship with the host government than was the case with
investments in the traditional private sector. Back in 1950 certainly, and for most of
the last fifty years, the risk most investors faced was that the government might
intervene in and expropriate a project. In contemporary infrastructure projects, the
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government tends to be an intimate partner-whether as issuer of the concession,
offtaker or guarantor of certain critical undertakings made to the project. The
contemporary concern is less that the government will throw the foreign investor out
as a partner than that the government will prove to be an unreliable partner and break
the promises it made and on which the foreign investor relied.
Conventional political risk insurance contracts are not particularly helpful
with respect to that concern. The OPIC contract, which is like the MIGA contract
on this point, says that the government's failure to perform its undertakings as a
supplier to the project, as a guarantor of an obligation to the project, as an off-
taker of the project, or as a contractor with the project will not, in any of those
circumstances, constitute expropriation for purposes of the insurance coverage.
Thus, traditional expropriation coverage is not responsive to a key contemporary
risk-government partnership risk. If the point of the investment insurance
programs of the agencies is to encourage emerging market investment in today's
world in which so much activity is happening through public-private partnerships,
then the programs may need to change if they are to be effective.
Notwithstanding the market's bias against innovation, the past few years
have brought some real progress toward adapting supply to the demands of the
market for breach of contract coverage. None of the insurers, public or private,
are willing to insure against breach of contract per se. But they will insure one
particular provision of the contract-the dispute resolution clause-at least if it
provides for arbitration, preferably offshore arbitration. If a breach of contract
gives rise to a dispute, the parties can refer that dispute to arbitration. Then, with
this "disputes coverage," the investor can rely on its political risk insurer to stand
behind an award that comes out of the arbitration process.
This is not a particularly dramatic development since it has been available in
some form from OPIC for more than a decade. It is evolving, however. For
instance, a current question is, what happens if the insured cannot achieve an
arbitral award because the host government frustrates the process, such as by
issuing injunctions against compliance with the arbitral provision? This question
is at the cutting edge of a number of insurer's programs. OPIC typically will
cover frustration of the arbitration process while MIGA has resisted doing so.
On the other hand, even if any insurer does not intend to cover frustration of
the process, it may be difficult to avoid paying a claim if the government with
which a dispute has arisen blocks or "expropriates" one's ability to satisfy the
terms of one's insurance contract-i.e., completion of the arbitral process. The
insurer would appear to enjoy a windfall from the government's engaging in acts
even worse than those (non-payment of an arbitral award) that would have
sufficed for a claim. OPIC recently was required by an arbitral panel to pay
claims filed by GE and Bechtel in connection with their investment in the Dabhol
Power project in India. The panel concluded, in effect, that, when the host
government had blocked the insured's ability to satisfy the requirements of the
OPIC contract (including, among other things, successfully obtaining an arbitral
award), these requirements should not be enforced against the insured.
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Given the recent track record of some governments (e.g., India and Indonesia)
trying to block arbitrations, developers would be wise to insist on frustration
coverage from their insurers. Today they are likely to be able to find it, though it may
require searching, negotiation, and additional cost.
There has also been pressure to find a more aggressive option for insuring
losses from government breaches than only insuring arbitral awards. Why should
an investor have to arbitrate obvious facts in order to be paid? For one category
of contracts-government payment guarantees-and one category of breaches-
non-payment-the market agrees. The commercial insurers have been a few
steps ahead of the agencies in this area, although the agencies may be catching
up. The commercial insurers have been willing to offer so-called non-honoring
(of guaranty) coverage under a theory that it will be obvious whether a guaranty
was performed or breached.
This is one step beyond where the agencies have been. They have generally
continued to insist that the breach be proved in arbitration, but further steps have
recently been taken by OPIC in its "non-honoring" (of sovereign guaranty)
product.
The second principal area of tension in the market is with respect to currency
risks. Ironically, a year after OPIC opened its doors, the world went off a fixed
exchange rate system. Without discussing the economics of this in detail, a
government that is running budget deficits in a fixed exchange rate world will
eventually deplete its foreign exchange reserves and will have difficulty maintaining
its (fixed) exchange rate. In fact, the government may have to close down the foreign
exchange operations at the central bank, whereupon the currency becomes
inconvertible. In a flexible exchange rate system, a shortage of foreign exchange
would simply cause foreign currencies to become more valuable relative to local
currency (i.e., the exchange rate would adjust). There would be no pressure on the
central bank to supply foreign currency at a fixed rate.
Nonetheless, OPIC, MIGA, and all the commercial insurers have sold a lot of
currency inconvertibility coverage over the years. Part of the demand for
inconvertibility coverage probably reflects the absence of any alternatives more
responsive to today's priority currency risk--devaluation.
The Asian economic crisis made it clear to project lenders that the primary
currency risk is not currency inconvertibility but rather- instability in currency
values (e.g., the risk of massive devaluations). How do project investors deal
with that risk? That remains an open, state of the art, question. OPIC provided
one glimmer of a possible solution in 2001, when it offered for the first time a
form of devaluation guaranty. It was issued to support a $300 million bond
offering for the AES Tiet hydropower projects in Brazil. The OPIC product
enabled the bonds to achieve an investment grade rating higher than that of
Brazilian government bonds. The terms of that guaranty have been somewhat
widely discussed-and debated. The financial feasibility of the guaranty requires
the guarantor to have confidence in the reliability of the international economics
principle of "purchasing power parity." While that principle is well-established,
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 18
this form of guaranty is not. To date it has been employed only once-in the AES
Tiet8 financing.
Shortly after OPIC closed that transaction, one of the commercial political
risk insurers announced that it would do the same thing, but this insurer has yet to
issue its first comparable guaranty. OPIC has yet to do its second deal. The
question remains open as to whether this product will establish itself in the
marketplace as a useful mitigant to devaluation risk.
Project developers and lenders continue to be concerned that they may not be
able to rely on the political risk insurance market to provide political risk coverage
that addresses their principal concerns. While there has been some evolution on the
supply side of the market, and substantial deal-by-deal negotiating occurs, a
significant mismatch prevails in the market between wants, on one hand, and what is
available on the other.
I would like to conclude with a note on the role of the public agencies in this
market. Intriguingly, a few years ago, when Congress last reviewed OPIC and
U.S. Ex-Im Bank, there was a concern that the commercial entrants to the market
had supplanted the agencies, which had come to constitute superfluous and unfair
competition. More recently, it has become clear that the agencies continue to fill
an important role-a role that the commercial insurers themselves appreciate as
they have participated in various joint ventures with the agencies. ADB has
closed some co-insurance arrangements with commercial insurers, as have OPIC
and MIGA. Without the public agency role in these investment transactions,
projects might not have happened. The commercial insurers have come to value
the agencies as partners.
Agencies also play a second important role, which is to explore new political
risk coverages. As discussed, political risks are not particularly susceptible to
definitive predictive analysis. So, how is an investor ever to coax a political risk
insurer to try something new? Here the agencies may offer a way forward. As a
matter of policy, the agency may decide that it makes sense to gamble on the
policy effectiveness, and business feasibility, of taking on a new category of
political risk-such as devaluation, breach of contract, or regulation risk. The
agency may take that risk for political and policy reasons, as the Marshall
Planners did fifty years ago. Those kinds of decisions constitute the agencies
betting on good behavior by host countries and gambling that the bet will pay off
well enough to maintain the solvency of their investment insurance programs.
The agencies are not without risk aversity, but they were established, and remain
willing, to take risks deemed unacceptable by the private market. In a number of
cases they have shown themselves willing to "give it a try" and see whether new
forms of political risk mitigants might turn out to work, not only to mitigate the
targeted risk but also to do so at a price that adequately compensates the agency
for the risk taken. For instance, OPIC has entered new areas that are beyond the
comfort zone of the commercial insurers. This market has become a public-
private partnership in which the agencies are likely to take the lead venturing into
new products and regions, joined by joint-venturing commercial insurance
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providers once the ice has been sufficiently broken by the agency insurers and
once the risks appear sufficiently manageable. While this model is not working
as well as some of the project developers and lenders would like, because it has
not yet yielded all of coverages that they would prefer, it does seem that it has
presented a reasonably decent prospect for the industry evolving beyond where it
was in 1950, and until fairly recently that evolution had not happened.
